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Resource allocation takes place in various kinds of real-world complex systems, such as the traffic systems,
social services institutions or organizations, or even the ecosystems. The fundamental principle underlying
complex resource-allocation dynamics is Boolean interactions associated with minority games, as resources are
generally limited and agents tend to choose the least used resource based on available information. A common
but harmful dynamical behavior in resource-allocation systems is herding, where there are time intervals during
which a large majority of the agents compete for a few resources, leaving many other resources unused. Ac-
companying the herd behavior is thus strong fluctuations with time in the number of resources being used. In
this paper, we articulate and establish that an intuitive control strategy, namely pinning control, is effective at
harnessing the herding dynamics. In particular, by fixing the choices of resources for a few agents while leaving
majority of the agents free, herding can be eliminated completely. Our investigation is systematic in that we
consider random and targeted pinning and a variety of network topologies, and we carry out a comprehensive
analysis in the framework of mean-field theory to understand the working of control. The basic philosophy is
then that, when a few agents waive their freedom to choose resources by receiving sufficient incentives, majority
of the agents benefit in that they will make fair, efficient, and effective use of the available resources. Our work
represents a basic and general framework to address the fundamental issue of fluctuations in complex dynamical
systems with significant applications to social, economical and political systems.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 02.50.-r, 89.75.Hc, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
Resource allocation is an essential process in many kinds
of real-world systems, such as traffic systems (e.g., Internet,
urban traffic grids, rail and flight networks), social service in-
stitutions or organizations (e.g., schools, marts, banks, and fi-
nancial markets), and ecosystems of various sizes. The under-
lying system typically contains a large number of interacting
components or agents on a hierarchy of scales, and there are
multiple resources available for each agent. As a result, com-
plex behaviors are expected to emerge ubiquitously in the dy-
namical process of resource allocation. In a typical situation,
agents or individuals possess similar capabilities, who share
the common goal of pursuing as high payoffs as possible. To
exploit the resource allocation dynamics in multi-agent sys-
tems to reduce the likelihood of or even to eliminate harmful
or catastrophic behaviors is of significant interest.
A general framework to address and understand the ex-
tremely rich and complex dynamics of many real-world sys-
tems is complex adaptive systems [1–3]. Especially suitable
for resource-allocation dynamics is the paradigm of minority-
game (MG) dynamics [4], introduced by Challet and Zhang
to address the classic El Farol bar-attendance problem con-
ceived by Arthur [5]. In an MG system, each agent makes
choice (+1 or −1, e.g., to attend a bar or to stay at home)
based on available global information in the memory such as
the winning choice in a previous round of interaction. In par-
ticular, the agents who got the minority choice are rewarded,
∗Electronic address: huangzg@lzu.edu.cn
and those belonging to the majority group lose due to limited
resources. The MG dynamics has been studied extensively in
the last decade or so [6–24].
There are two basic and related approaches to the MG
problem. One is based on the mean-field approximation,
which was mainly developed by the statistical-physics com-
munity to relate the MG problem to those associated with non-
equilibrium phase transitions [25–27]. Another approach is
based on Boolean-game (BG) dynamics, where for any agent,
detailed information about agents that it interacts with is as-
sumed to be available, and the agent responds accordingly
[28–33]. One interesting result was that coordination can
emerge from local interactions in BG and, as a result, the sys-
tem as a whole can achieve “better than random” performance
in terms of utilization of resources.
A common behavior in many social, economical and
ecosystems is herding, where many agents take on the same
action [34]. In the past, the herd behavior has been extensively
studied and recognized to be one important factor contribut-
ing to the origin of complexity, which can lead to enhanced
fluctuations and significant reduction in the payoff of the en-
tire system [11, 35–37]. For the resource-allocation problem,
the desired performance is that all the resources are used ef-
ficiently. When herding occurs, many agents may go after
a very limited number of resources, causing crowding in the
use of these resources, while many other resources are sig-
nificantly under-used. The herd behavior is thus regarded as
harmful for resource-distribution systems. An outstanding is-
sue is whether effective control strategy can be developed to
prevent herding in multi-agent systems with competition for
multiple resources.
In this paper, we investigate a realistically feasible control
strategy to harnessing herding in complex resource-allocation
2systems, pinning control in the framework of Boolean dynam-
ics. In particular, we show that even a small amount of pinning
can effectively prevent or greatly mitigate the herd behavior
in resource-allocation systems. Take the urban traffic system
as an example. The basic idea of pinning control is to select
certain individuals and pin (or fix) their options to access re-
sources by certain incentives, e.g., compensations or rewards.
This is similar in spirit to the strategy of immunization to pre-
vent wide spread of disease or virus in complex social or tech-
nological networked systems [38–42], where certain individ-
uals are preferred to be immunized to the virus of concern.
However, as we show analytically and demonstrate numeri-
cally in this work, the dynamical mechanism of pinning con-
trol in resource-allocation systems is quite different from that
underlying the immunization problem in complex networks.
In general, we anticipate pinning control to be an effective
strategy to eliminate or suppress harmful herd behaviors in
complex systems describable by Boolean-game dynamics.
In Sec. II, we describe our Boolean-game model under pin-
ning control. In Sec. III, we present a conventional mean-field
theory to analyze the dynamics of free systems in the absence
of control. In Sec. IV, we point out the difficulties associated
with the conventional mean-field theory and develop a modi-
fied mean-field theory to understand the system behavior un-
der pinning control. Different pinning schemes and network
topologies are considered. In Sec. V, we offer concluding re-
marks and discuss relevance of our results to real-world com-
plex systems.
II. MODEL
A. Boolean-game dynamics
Similar to the MG dynamics, there are two alternative re-
sources: r = +1 and −1 in a BG dynamic system, and
only the agents belonging to the global minority group are
rewarded by +1. As a result, the system profit is equal to the
number of agents in the global-minority group. In particu-
lar, we consider a BG dynamic system composed of N agents
competing for the two resources, both of which have accom-
modating capacity N/2. If the number of agents choosing one
given r (+1 or −1) is smaller than N/2, then it is the global-
minority group, and the system profit is equal to the number
of agents in this group.
While, a unique feature of the BG dynamic system, in con-
trast to the original MG dynamic system, is that agents make
use of only local information from immediate neighbor in
making choice. The neighborhood of agents is determined
by the connecting structure of the underlying network. Each
agent receives inputs from its neighboring agents and updates
its state according to the Boolean function, a function that
generates either +1 and −1 from the inputs [30]. Here, to
be concrete, we assume that, an agent i who has ki neighbors,
will choose +1 at time step t+ 1 with the probability,
Pi→⊕ = n
t
−/(n
t
+ + n
t
−) = n
t
−/ki, (1)
and−1 with the probabilityPi→⊖ = 1−Pi→⊕. Here, nt+ and
nt− respectively are the numbers of +1 and −1 neighbors of
agent i at time step t. Notably, agent in BG dynamics attempts
to take on a global-minority choice without any global infor-
mation (e.g., previous global-minority choice), but basing her
choice on the observation of neighbors’ previous behavior.
The dynamical variable of the BG system is At, the num-
ber of +1 agents in the system at time step t. Obviously, the
optimal solution for the resource allocation is At = N/2. A
measure of BG system’s performance is the variance of At:
σ2 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(At − N
2
)2, (2)
which characterizes the statistical deviation from the optimal
resource utilization over time interval T [31]. A smaller value
of σ2 corresponds to more optimal resource allocation and
thus leads to higher efficiency. A general phenomenon in BG
system is that, as agents strive to join the minority group,
harmful herd behavior can emerge, associated with which
large oscillation in At takes place. Our goal is to develop an
efficient control strategy to suppress or eliminate the harmful
herd behavior.
B. Pinning control scheme
Our basic idea to control herd behavior is to “pin” certain
agents to freeze their states so as to realize optimal resource
allocation, following the general principle of pinning control
of complex dynamical networks [43–49]. In our approach, the
fraction of agents to be pinned (fixed) is ρpin, and the fraction
of unpinned or free nodes is ρfree = 1−ρpin. The numbers of
free agents and pinned agents are Nf = N · ρfree and Np =
N ·ρpin, respectively. The free agents make choices according
to local information, while the inputs from the pinned agents
are fixed.
Our pinning scheme has two features: order of pinning and
pinning pattern. First, the order of pinning denotes the way
how certain agents are chosen for pinning. We consider two
methods: random pinning (RP), where a number of agents are
randomly chosen to be pinned, and degree-preferential pin-
ning (DPP) in which agents are selected for pinning accord-
ing to their connectivity or degree in the underlying network.
In particular, agents with higher degree are more likely to be
pinned. These two methods thus correspond to random error
and intentional attack in the literature on robustness of net-
work systems [50–53]. The second feature, pinning pattern,
defines the particular states that the selected agents are pinned
to. Here we define “All +1” (or “All−1”) as the pattern where
all the pinned agents are forced to choose +1 (or −1), and
“Half ±1” as the situation where the agents are to be pinned
at +1 and −1 alternately. The effect of pinning also depends
on the network topology. We consider four representative net-
work topologies: all-to-all coupling, random [54], scale-free
[55], and assortatively mixed scale-free networks [56].
To facilitate a comparative analysis between the free and
the pinned systems, we define a modified cumulative variance
3as,
σ2 =
1
T
∑T
t=1(At − N2 )2
1− ρpin , (3)
so that the fluctuations of the systems are comparable with
respect to ρpin ∈ [0, 1).
C. Simulation results
Simulations are carried out for resource-allocation dynam-
ics on the following types of networks: fully connected net-
works (FCN), ER random networks [54], scale-free networks
(SFN) [55], and under the two pinning schemes (RP or DPP).
The states of the pinned agents are set according to “Half±1”,
“All +1”, and “All−1.” For all the free agents, +1 and−1 are
uniformly distributed initially. The evolutionary time is set to
be T = 104. As an example, Fig. 1 shows, for FCN and SFN,
time series of At for different pinning fraction ρpin, where the
pinning scheme is DPP under the rule “Half ±1.” We observe
that, in the absence of pinning control (ρpin = 0), herd behav-
ior prevails in the free system, associated with which there are
oscillations with extremely large variances σ2. Such a fluctua-
tion state in which At oscillates between 0 and N is in fact an
absorbing state of the system, in which the resource allocation
is extremely unreasonable and inefficient. As pinning control
is turned on, even when only a few agents are pinned, e.g.,
ρpin = 0.01, the fluctuations are weakened considerably and
harmful absorbing state no long exists. Figure 1 also shows
the corresponding distributions of At for different cases. The
general numerical observation is that pinning control is highly
effective in suppressing or even eliminating herd behavior.
III. MEAN-FIELD THEORY OF FREE SYSTEMS
We aim to develop a comprehensive theoretical understand-
ing of the pinning control method with respect to herd behav-
ior. To gain insight, we first derive an analytic theory for free
systems.
In the mean-field framework, agents in different states are
well mixed. At time step t, An individual i of degree ki
has on average nt+ = kiρt⊕ neighbors that adopt +1, where
ρt⊕ = At/N is the density of +1 agents in the whole system.
According to the updating rule Eq. (1), i will choose +1 at the
next time step t+ 1 with the probability
Pi→⊕ = ki(1 − ρt⊕)/ki = 1− ρt⊕. (4)
The probability for an agent to choose−1 is Pi→⊖ = ρt⊕. The
conditional transition probability for At+1 agents to select +1
at the next time step t+1 obeys the binomial distribution given
by
P (At+1|At) =
(
N
At+1
)
· (Pi→⊕)At+1 ·
(1− Pi→⊕)N−At+1 . (5)
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FIG. 1: (Color online). For FCN (a) and SFN network (c), time series
At for ρpin = 0, 0.01, 0.1, and 0.2. The network size is N = 600
and average degree is 〈k〉 = 6. The pinning rule is DPP with “Half
±1.” The probability density distributions P (At) for ρpin = 0.01,
0.1, and 0.2 (b,d) are calculated from time series At of length T =
104.
4The expectation value of At+1 is E(At+1) = N · Pi→⊕, and
the variance of At+1 about E(At+1) can be explicitly written
as δ2 = N · Pi→⊕ · (1− Pi→⊕). From Eq. (4), we have,
E(At+1) = N · (1− ρt⊕) = N −At. (6)
The expected difference of At+1 from the optimal solution
N/2 is
∆At+1 = E(At+1)−N/2 = N −At −N/2 = −∆At.
The relation of the expected departures from the optimal state
for two successive time steps is thus
|∆At+1| = |∆At|. (7)
If a large event takes place initially in the system (e.g.,
At=0 ≫ N/2, or At=0 ≪ N/2), the departure from N/2 will
not decrease, so large oscillations will persist with the state of
the winning side reversing at each time step. In fact, At is a
Markov-chain process with successive random number drawn
from Eq. (5). As soon as At reaches zero or N in the stochas-
tic process, At will oscillate between 0 and N continuously,
landing the free system in an absorbing state. Herd behavior is
thus prevalent in the free system, a hallmark of which is large
oscillations in At.
A key quantity in the stochastic description of the resource-
allocation process is the distribution P (At), the probabil-
ity that At agents adopt +1 at time t. Since At fluctuates
about N/2, the choice +1 acts as the global majority and mi-
nority choice alternately. The stable distribution thus obeys
P (At+2l) = P (At) and P (At+2l+1) = P (At+1), for l ∈ N.
According to Eq. (5), the conditional transition probability
for two successive time steps t and t+1, we have the following
two-step conditional probability, or the transition probability:
T (At+2, At) ≡ P (At+2|At) (8)
=
∑
At+1
P (At+2|At+1) · P (At+1|At).
To simplify notation, we set At = i, At+1 = k, and At+2 =
j, with i, k, j ∈ [0, N ]. The conditional transition probability
of the free system is thus given by
T (j, i) ≡ P (j, t+ 2|i, t)
=
∑
k
P (j, t+ 2|k, t+ 1) · P (k, t+ 1|i, t)
=
∑
k
[
(
N
j
)
· (1− k
N
)j · ( k
N
)N−j ] · [
(
N
k
)
·
(1− i
N
)k · ( i
N
)N−k].
The resulting balance equation governing the dynamics of the
Markov chain reads,
P (j) =
∑
i
P (j, t+ 2|i, t)P (i) =
∑
i
T (j, i)P (i), (9)
which is in fact a discrete-time master equation. For large
t, the system evolves into the stable state defined by P (i) =
P (j). Equation (9) can be written in the matrix form as
P (A) = TP (A), (10)
where T is an N×N matrix with element Tji = T (j, i). The
stable distribution of At is then P1(A), the eigenvector of ma-
trix T associated with eigenvalue λ = 1. For the free system,
we thus obtain P (A) = δA,0 or δA,N with equal probability
on average, where the exact value of P (A) depends on the
initial condition and the number of time steps (even or odd).
This explains the simulation results in Fig. 1 for the case of
ρpin = 0, where At = 0, N, 0, ... is an absorbing state and
thus is the stable state of the free system. Once we obtain the
stable distribution P (A) analytically from Eq. (10), we can
calculate the cumulative variance [Eq. (3)] of the system as,
σ2 =
(At −N/2)2
1− ρpin =
∑N
A=0 P (A)(A−N/2)2
1− ρpin . (11)
The fluctuation of the free system is thus given by σ2 =
N2/4.
While we have considered the resource-allocation dynam-
ics in networked systems in which agents interact with each
other without any restriction, the discrete-time master equa-
tion Eq. (10) can be used to analyze and understand oscillatory
dynamics in general complex adaptive systems.
IV. MEAN-FIELD ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS UNDER
PINNING CONTROL
We now develop a theory to understand the working of pin-
ning control in suppressing/eliminating herd behavior. The
setting is a networked system of N agents in which a fraction
ρpin of the agents are not allowed to choose resources freely.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the “Half±1” pinning
rule.
A. Mean-field analysis for well-mixed free and pinned agents
We first consider the case of random pinning. Under the
assumption that the dynamical properties of pinned and free
nodes are identical, the interactions among them are well-
mixed. Consequently, the probability for the neighbor of one
given free agent to be pinned is
Pp = Np/N = ρpin, (12)
where Np is the number of pinned agents in the system. For
a free agent i with degree ki, the average numbers of pinned
and free neighbors, denoted by np and nf , respectively, are
nf = (1− Pp)ki = (1 − ρpin)ki,
np = Ppki = ρpinki, (13)
5where half of a pinned neighbor adopt +1, and the other half
adopt −1. According to the updating rule Eq. (1), the proba-
bility for i to choose +1 at the next time step t+ 1 is
Pi→⊕ =
nf (1− ρt,f⊕ ) + np/2
ki
= (1−ρpin)(1−ρt,f⊕ )+
ρpin
2
,
(14)
where ρt,f⊕ stands for the density of free agents who choose
+1, and ρt⊕ is the density of +1 agents in the whole system.
When ρpin = 0, ρt,f⊕ reduced to ρt⊕, we have Pi→⊕ = 1 −
ρt⊕, which is reduced to the result for the free system, that is,
Eq. (4).
Using a similar reasoning that leads to the conditional tran-
sition probability of At+1 for the free system as in Eq. (5), we
obtain the corresponding result for the pinning system:
P (At+1|At) = P (Aft+1|Aft )
=
(
Nf
Aft+1
)
· (Pi→⊕)A
f
t+1 · (1− Pi→⊕)Nf−A
f
t+1 , (15)
where At′ and Aft′ are related by At′ = A
f
t′ + Np/2, A
f
t′
and Np/2 are the numbers of free +1 agents and pinned +1
agents in the system at time t′, respectively. The deviation of
At from the optimal state N/2 is mainly due to the fluctuation
of the free agents. From the binomial distribution, we get the
expectation number of the free +1 agents at time t + 1, and
the variance about the expectation number as,
E(Aft+1) = Nf · Pi→⊕,
δ2f = Nf · Pi→⊕ · (1− Pi→⊕). (16)
The expectation number of +1 agents (including the pinned
+1 agents) is
E(At+1) = E(A
f
t+1) +Np/2, (17)
which can be written as a function of ρpin and At:
E(At+1) = (1− ρpin) · (N − At) + ρpin · N
2
, (18)
= (N −At) + ρpin · (At − N
2
). (19)
From Eq. (19), we obtain the following expected difference
from N/2:
∆At+1 = E(At+1)−N/2 = −(1− ρpin) · (At −N/2)
= −(1− ρpin) ·∆At (20)
The relation between the expected deviations from the optimal
state N/2 for two successive time steps is then given by
|∆At+1| = (1− ρpin) · |∆At|. (21)
Compared with the expected departure obtained in the free
system, as given by Eq. (7), we see that, once pinning is im-
plemented, the deviation from the optimal state decays by the
factor (1 − ρpin) at each time step and, consequently, the os-
cillation of the system is suppressed. In case of large events,
pinning will make At to approach the equilibrium value N/2.
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FIG. 2: (Color online). Analytical results of the stable distribution
of Af (a) and A (b) for a system of N = 201 agents, from the
mean-field analysis under the assumption of well-mixed interactions
between the pinned and free agents, as given by Eq. (22). The graph
P (A) in (b) is on a logarithmic-normal plot.
A stochastic analysis similar to that for the free system can
then be carried out for a pinning system. From Eqs. (8) and
(15), we can get the conditional transition probability from
time step t to t+ 2 as,
T (j, i) ≡ P (j, t+ 2|i, t) (22)
=
∑
k
P (j, t+ 2|k, t+ 1) · P (k, t+ 1|i, t)
=
∑
k
{[
(
Nf
j − 12Np
)
· (1− k
N
)j−
1
2
Np · ( k
N
)Nf−(j−
1
2
Np)]
·[
(
Nf
k − 12Np
)
· (1− i
N
)k−
1
2
Np · ( i
N
)Nf−(k−
1
2
Np)]},
where i, k, j ∈ [Np/2, N − Np/2], which denote At, At+1,
and At+2, respectively. Following the steps from Eq. (9) to
Eq. (11) for a free system, we can derive formulas of P (Af )
and P (A) for the pinning system, based on the assumption
Eq. (12) that the pinned and free nodes are identical with well-
mixed interactions. Figure 2 shows the corresponding results
6for different values of ρpin. We see that the stable distribu-
tion P (A) has a Gaussian profile, with the expectation value
of E(A) = N/2, which should be compared with the value
P (A) = δA,0 or δA,N for the free system. This result indi-
cates that the harmful absorbing state associated with a free
system has essentially been eliminated even when only a few
agents are pinned. Representative numerical evidence sup-
porting this result is shown in Fig. 1 for FCN and SFN with
only 1% of the agents pinned.
From Eq. (11), we can calculate the variance σ2 of the sys-
tem for different values of ρpin analytically, as shown by the
open circle marked “MF1” in Fig. 3. Simulation results for
FCN (open black square), SFN (solid triangle) and ER ran-
dom network (open triangle) under DPP (up triangle) or RP
(down triangle) and the “Half ±1” rule are also shown. We
observe that the variance σ2 of the system decreases dramat-
ically in a power-law manner as pinning control is turned on,
and the agreement between theoretical prediction and numer-
ical simulations for FCN is good. However, for ER random
network and SFN, there is marked difference between the the-
oretical and numerical results, especially for the DPP scheme,
indicating that the approach of mean-field, stochastic type of
analysis may not be adequate to account for the behavior of
the system under pinning control. In the following, we shall
develop a modified mean-field analysis to overcome this diffi-
culty.
B. Modified mean-field analysis
The assumption Eq. (12) in which free and pinned agents
are identical and well mixed may not be valid in general, es-
pecially when the underlying network is heterogeneous, such
as SFNs. In such a case, the probability for a free node to
contact with a pinned node will deviate from ρpin, requiring
modifications of the conventional mean-field analysis.
1. Analysis of degree-preferential pinning on scale-free networks
We first discuss the DPP scheme on SFNs generated by the
classic preferential-attachment rule [55], with the degree dis-
tribution given by P (k) = 2m2/k3, where m is the number
of edges each new node brings in as the system grows. The
average degree of the network is 〈k〉 = 2m, and the minimum
degree is kmin = m. For DPP scheme from large to small
degree, the density of pinned agents ρpin and the minimum
degree of pinned agents (denoted by k′) are related to each
other as
ρpin =
∫ ∞
k′
P (k)dk, (23)
giving
k′ =
√
m2
ρpin
, (24)
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FIG. 3: (Color online). Modified cumulative variance σ2 [Eq. (3)]
as a function of ρpin from mean-field analysis (red circle marked by
“MF1”), where pinned and free nodes are well mixed as in Eq. (22).
Simulation results for FCN, SFN, and ER random network are also
shown, where all network size is N = 201, the pinning schemes are
RP and DPP under the “Half ±1” rule, the average degrees of SFN
and ER random networks is 〈k〉 = 6, and the number of network
realizations is 200. The graphs in (a) and (b) are on a logarithmic
and a logarithmic-linear scale, respectively.
which can be used to distinguish pinned and free agents in
terms of their degrees, i.e., an agent with k ≥ k′ (or k < k′)
is pinned (or free). The total number of links in the whole
network, denoted by L, is
L =
1
2
∫ ∞
kmin
kNP (k)dk. (25)
The number of the so-called pinning-affected links Lpin and
that of free-related links Lfree can be defined, respectively, as
Lpin =
1
2
∫ ∞
k′
kNP (k)dk, (26)
Lfree =
1
2
∫ k′
kmin
kNP (k)dk, (27)
7where Lpin + Lfree = L. From the fraction of pinning-
affected links, we have the following probability for one
neighbor of a given free agent to be a pinned agent:
Pp = Lpin/L. (28)
For a SFN under DPP, we have L = mN , Lpin = mN
√
ρpin,
and Lfree = mN(1 − √ρpin) and, consequently, Pp =√
ρpin. It should be noted that Eq. (28) differs from Eq. (12) in
that the former is expressed in terms of the pinning-affected
links and the latter is with respect to the fraction of pinned
agents. This difference underlies our modified mean-field
analysis.
Utilizing Eq. (28), we can write the average numbers of the
free and pinned neighbors for a free agent i of degree ki as
nf = (1− Pp)ki = (1−√ρpin)ki, (29)
np = Ppki =
√
ρpin (30)
Similar to the analysis procedure from Eq. (14) to Eq. (22), we
can obtain the corresponding results for SFNs with DPP under
the “Half ±1” rule. The probability for agent i to choose +1
is
Pi→⊕ =
nf (1 − ρt,f⊕ ) + np/2
ki
= (1− Pp)(1 − ρt,f⊕ ) + Pp/2
=
1− Pp
1− ρpin (1 − ρ
t
⊕) +
Pp − ρpin
2(1− ρpin)
≡ a(1− ρt⊕) + b. (31)
The expectation numbers of free +1 agents and all +1 agents
[E(Aft+1) and E(At+1), respectively] can then be obtained
from Eqs. (16) and (17). The expected deviation of At from
the optimal state for two successive time steps is given by
|∆At+1| = (1−√ρpin) · |∆At|. (32)
Furthermore, from Eqs. (15) and (31), we can get the condi-
tional transition probability from time step t to t+ 2 as
T (j, i) ≡ P (j, t+ 2|i, t)
=
∑
k
P (j, t+ 2|k, t+ 1) · P (k, t+ 1|i, t)
=
∑
k
{[
(
Nf
j − 12Np
)
· (Pp
2
+ Pf ·
Nf − k + Np2
Nf
)j−
1
2
Np ·
(
Pp
2
+ Pf
k − Np2
Nf
)Nf−(j−
1
2
Np)]
·[
(
Nf
k − 12Np
)
· (Pp
2
+ Pf ·
Nf − i+ Np2
Nf
)k−
1
2
Np ·
(
Pp
2
+ Pf
k − Np2
Nf
)Nf−(i−
1
2
Np)]}, (33)
where i, k, j ∈ [Np/2, N − Np/2] are associated with At,
At+1, and At+2, respectively, and Pf = 1 − Pp. Similar
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FIG. 4: (Color online). Modified cumulative variance σ2 as a
function of ρpin as predicted by the mean-field analysis (red cir-
cle marked by “MF1”), by our modified mean-field analysis (black
square marked by “MF2”), in comparison with the simulation results
(blue triangle). Note that “MF2” under RP scheme is the same as
“MF1” (see Sec. IV B 3). Simulations are for SFNs (a) and ER ran-
dom networks (b), all of average degree 6. Network size is N = 150
and the pinning scheme is DPP under the “Half ±1” rule. The simu-
lation results are averaged over 1000 realizations.
to analysis of free systems [Eqs. (10) and (11)], we obtain
the analytic results of P (A) and σ2 of the pinning system
in terms of the fraction of pinning-affected links, as shown
in Fig. 4 [marked by “MF2 (DPP) on SFN”], together with
the corresponding simulation results [marked by “Simu.(DPP)
on SFN”]. For comparison, result from the original mean-
field analysis (MF1) is also included. We see that our modi-
fied mean-field analysis yields results that match more closely
those from simulations.
82. Degree-preferential pinning on random networks
The degree of ER random network [54] obeys Poisson dis-
tribution:
P (k) =
e−〈k〉〈k〉k
k!
. (34)
The relation between k′ and ρpin can then be written as
ρpin =
kmax∑
k=k′+1
P (k), (35)
where the maximum degree kmax for a network of size N can
be calculated by P (kmax) ≈ 1/N . The degree k′ for a given
ρpin can be calculated numerically. The quantities L, Lpin,
and Lfree are, respectively, given by
L =
1
2
∞∑
k=1
kNP (k) =
1
2
kmax∑
k=1
kNe−〈k〉〈k〉k
k!
(36)
Lpin =
1
2
∞∑
k=k′+1
kNP (k)
=
1
2
kmax∑
k=k′+1
kNe−〈k〉〈k〉k
k!
(37)
Lfree =
1
2
k′∑
k=1
kNP (k) =
1
2
k′∑
k=1
kNe−〈k〉〈k〉k
k!
(38)
Following a similar modified mean-field analysis for SFNs,
we can calculate k′ for a given value of ρpin. The quanti-
ties Pp, Pi→⊕, T (j, i), the stable distribution P (A), and fi-
nally σ2 can then be obtained as a function of ρpin, as shown
in Fig. 4(b). We see that the modified mean-field analysis
[marked by “MF2 (DPP) on ER”] gives more accurate pre-
diction about the system behaviors.
3. Random pinning
For random pinning on a network of a given degree distri-
bution P (k), the number of pinning-affected links and free
links are
Lpin =
1
2
∫ ∞
kmin
kNρpinP (k)dk = ρpinL, (39)
Lfree =
1
2
∫ ∞
kmin
kN(1− ρpin)P (k)dk
= (1 − ρpin)L, (40)
where the number L of total links is given by Eq. (25). In the
RP process, the value of Lpin and Lfree are independent of
the degree distribution P (k). We thus have
Pp = Lpin/L = ρpin. (41)
Similar to the analysis of DPP on heterogeneous networks, we
can obtain nf and np and substitute them into Eq. (31) to get
Pi→⊕ = 1 − ρt⊕. We see that the quantities Pp and Pi→⊕
for RP are the same as those given by Eqs. (14) and (31) from
the idealized mean-field analysis, regardless of the network
structure. The reason is that for RP, the pinned and free nodes
tend to mix well on the network, satisfying the basic mean-
field assumption. A consequence is then that the relation be-
tween ∆At+1 and ∆At, the conditional transition probabil-
ity T (j, i), and the stable distribution P (A) are identical to
those given by the idealized mean-field analysis [Eq. (12) to
Eq. (22)]. As a consequence, the analytical results for ran-
dom pinning from the modified mean-field analysis [marked
by “MF2 (RP)”] are the same as those from the original mean-
field analysis [marked by “MF1”], as shown in Figs. 3 and 4.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The collective behavior of herding can occur commonly in
complex resource-distribution systems, the hallmark of which
is strong and even extreme fluctuations in the usage of avail-
able resources. In particular, for a free system without any
external intervention, typically the resources are accessed and
utilized in a highly non-uniform manner: there are time inter-
vals in which almost all resources are used, followed by those
in which most agents in the system focus on only a few re-
sources. Such an uneven utilization of resources makes the
system inefficient and is generally harmful. What we have
shown in this paper is that, implementing a simple pinning
control scheme can effectively eliminate herding. While the
idea of pinning control has been used widely to control com-
plex networked systems [43–49], our contribution is to intro-
duce it to complex resource-allocation systems. More impor-
tantly, we have developed a solid physical theory based on the
mean-field approach and its variant to establish the theoretical
foundation of the pinning control in such systems. Specifi-
cally, we have analyzed the approaches of random and degree-
preferential pinning on networks of distinct topologies, and
demonstrated that a non-random type of control strategy can
be more effective than a random one [cf. Figs. 3 and 4]. The
basic philosophy underlying our control scheme is “to pin a
few to benefit the majority.” That is, fixing a few agents’
choice of resource utilization can reduce significantly the fluc-
tuations in the whole system, resulting in remarkable improve-
ment in its efficiency.
Our theory suggests that the best strategy to reduce fluctua-
tions through pinning is to choose the agents of high degrees.
However, one difficulty associated with the degree preferen-
tial pinning scheme is that it requires fairly complete knowl-
edge about the degree of each agent in the network. This is
especially challenging for real-world networks, where global
information about the network may not be available to every
agent. In addition, the interactions among the agents when
competing for resources may not be readily quantified. An
important issue concerns thus how herd behavior can be con-
trolled when information about the network structure and in-
teractions among the agents is lacking. Immunization method
developed in controlling virus spreading on complex networks
[38], which requires no detailed knowledge about the network
9and its interacting dynamics, may provide a viable approach.
For example, one can consider the scheme of acquaintance
pinning, in which random acquaintances of random nodes are
pinned in their selection of resources.
Real-world systems for which Boolean game model and
pinning scheme may be applicable include the financial mar-
ket systems, urban traffic systems, computer network sys-
tems, and so on. In these systems, individuals’ choice can
be “pinned” by means of certain incentive policies with com-
pensations or rewards. The incentive policy for pinning can be
modelled as random fields in the dynamics and may introduce
a cost linear to the number of pinned agents. We see that the
system welfare, i.e., the performance of the resource alloca-
tion system measured by the variance of the number of agents
choosing a resource, improves rapidly as soon as very few pin-
nings take place. Take the financial market system as an exam-
ple, where the policies of the Market Makers are the strategy
to intervene the game dynamics in the market by certain regu-
lations or incentives so as to make the capital allocation more
efficient, i.e., to realize the goal of achieving efficient mar-
kets. Our study of pinning control is directly relevant to these
real-world examples. In addition to its real significance, our
work represents a basic and general mathematical framework
to address the role of pinning in complex resource-allocation
dynamics in social, economical and political systems.
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